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Despite its heavy human, financial, and economic 
cost, the recent global recession provides a unique 
opportunity to reflect on the knowledge from several 
decades of growth research, draw policy lessons from 
the experience of successful countries, and explore new 
approaches going forward. In an increasingly globalized 
world where fighting poverty is not only a moral 
responsibility but also a strategy for confronting some of 
the major problems (diseases, malnutrition, insecurity 
and violence) that ignore boundaries and contribute to 
global insecurity, thinking about new ways of generating 
This paper—a product of the Office of the Vice President, Development Economics—is part of a larger effort in the 
department to revisit strategies for achieving sustainable growth in developing countries. Policy Research Working Papers 
are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at research@worldbank.org.  
and sustaining growth is a crucial task for economists. 
This paper reassesses the evolution of knowledge on 
growth and suggests a new structural approach to the 
analysis. It offers a brief, critical review of lessons learned 
from growth research and examines the remaining 
challenges—especially from the policy standpoint. It 
highlights how the 2008 Growth Commission Report 
identifies the stylized facts associated with sustained 
and inclusive growth. And it explains how the new 
structural economics provides a consistent framework for 
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Economists have always been conflicted between the need to understand the dynamics of 
business cycles, and the study of long-term growth—both of which are important for human 
welfare. The world economy has just experienced a severe financial and economic crisis
1, which 
has justified the intellectual focus on stabilization policies, especially given the role that 
coordinated and decisive monetary and fiscal policies have played in preventing the global 
recession from becoming a worldwide depression. But the persistence of poverty in many parts 
of the world and the potential long-term impact of the crisis on global poverty reduction also 
highlight the importance of policies that are conducive to sustainable and inclusive growth.
2 
Economic growth is indeed the main source of divergences in living standards across countries 
and regions of the world. As Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) observe, “if we can learn about 
government policy options that have even small effects on long-term growth rates, we can 
contribute much more to improvements in standards of living than has been provided by the 
entire history of macroeconomic analysis of countercyclical policy and fine tuning.” 
 
In fact, economic growth may be the single most important issue confronting economists today. 
The differences in output per worker and national income across countries are still puzzling. 
According to calculations by Maddison (2001), world population rose 22–fold over the past 
millennium. Per capita income increased 13–fold, world GDP nearly 300–fold. This contrasts 
sharply with the preceding millennium, when world population grew by only a sixth, and there 
was no advance in per capita income. Measured in today’s living standards, all countries in the 
world were poor in the beginning of the 18
th century. Sustained growth in income per capita only 
picked up after 1820: per capita income rose more than eightfold. 
 
A well-known fact confirmed by the recent crisis is the observation that countries that have 
sustained high rates of growth have also performed well despite the global meltdown. Their 
dynamic performance has made them more resilient. With strong external balance sheets and 
ample room for fiscal maneuver before the crisis, they were able to implement countercyclical 
policies to combat external shocks. “A crisis is a terrible thing to waste,” said Paul Romer, one of 
the preeminent theorists of growth. Despite its heavy human, financial and economic cost, the 
recent recession provides a unique opportunity to reflect on the knowledge from several decades 
of growth research, draw policy lessons from the experience of successful countries, and explore 
new approaches going forward. 
 
                                                            
1 The losses precipitated by the financial crisis have been enormous. Total capitalization of world stock markets 
halved in 2008 - about $32 trillion of wealth. The losses in household wealth during 2008 were about $11 trillion in 
the United States ($8.5 trillion in financial assets and $2.5 trillion in housing assets) and were estimated at $1.5 
trillion in the United Kingdom ($0.6 trillion in financial assets and $0.9 trillion in housing assets). Losses of such 
magnitude have significant wealth effects on consumption and savings. Industrial production fell sharply in many 
developed and emerging countries and for the first time since 1929, world trade contracted in 2009. Data sources: 
Global Stability Reports; IMF Survey Magazine, June 24, 2009. 
2 There were 1.4 billion people living under $1.25 international poverty line before the global crisis. Applying the 
country-specific growth projections to survey-based data and aggregating, World Bank experts calculate that the 
crisis will add 50 million people to the 2009 count of the number of people living below $1.25 a day and 57 million 
to the count of the number of people living under $2 a day. Given current growth projections for 2010, there will be 
a further impact on poverty in that year, with the cumulative impacts rising to an extra 64 million people living 
under $1.25 a day and 76 million more under $2 a day by 2010. 3 
 
Looking at the data, one may be surprised to note that the recession has obscured the broader 
economic narrative of our time, which is the remarkable economic performance of many poor 
countries, especially in the past ten years. Leaving aside the United States, which ranks third, the 
four most populous countries of the world (Brazil, China, India, Indonesia), have made great 
strides, averaging annual growth rates well over 6 percent a year. That is a vast improvement in 
the standards of living for more than 40 percent of the world’s population. The same trends are in 
place in many other South American countries (Chile, Colombia, Peru) and in some African 
countries (Botswana, Mauritius, Tunisia, Ghana). 
 
To be sure, poverty reduction is still a very challenging development issue. In an increasingly 
globalized world where fighting poverty is not only a moral responsibility but also a strategy for 
confronting some of the major problems (diseases, malnutrition, insecurity and violence) that 
ignore boundaries and contribute to global insecurity, thinking about new ways of generating and 
sustaining growth is a crucial task for economists. It is therefore essential to continue searching 
for new ideas on the mechanics of wealth creation. Over the last 50 years, much progress has 
been made, most recently with the work of the Growth Commission Report.
3 But beyond a 
consensus on broad principles and the rejection of one-size-fits all approaches, economists still 
face significant challenges in identifying actionable policy levers that are directly relevant to 
specific countries. 
 
This paper reassesses the evolution of knowledge on growth and suggests a new structural 
approach to the analysis. Section 2 offers a brief, critical review of lessons learned from growth 
research and examines the remaining challenges—especially from the policy standpoint. Section 
3 highlights the important recent contribution of the Growth Commission Report and the 
identification of stylized facts associated with sustained and inclusive growth. Section 4 provides 
a consistent framework for understanding its key findings through the lenses of new structural 
economics. Section 5 offers some concluding thoughts. 
 
2. THE QUEST FOR GROWTH: AN UNFINISHED JOURNEY 
 
Economic historians who have examined the evolution of growth performance throughout 
history tend to divide it into three distinct periods: The first one, which spanned most of human 
history up to the middle of the 18
th century, was marked by static living standards, despite 
population growth—the so-called Malthusian conditions. The second one, which lasted from 
about 1750 to the 1820s, was characterized by some improvement in living standards, and 
changes in demographic trends (higher fertility rates and lower mortality rates). The third epoch, 
observed initially in England at the end of the first quarter of the 19
th century, has been that of 
modern economic growth (Cameron, 1993). Deciphering the mystery of modern economic 
growth and explaining convergence and divergence have been major topics of research, 
especially since the 1950s. While much progress has been achieved on theoretical and empirical 
grounds, much remains to be understood on the policy front. 
                                                            
3 The report was released in 2008 and titled ‘The Growth Report: Strategies for Sustained Growth and Inclusive 
Development”. The Commission was constituted of 20 experienced policymakers and two Nobel prize-winning 
economists, Michael Spence and Robert Solow. Its work has been supported by the Governments of Australia, 
Sweden, the Netherlands, and United Kingdom, the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, and the World Bank 
Group. 4 
 
Growth Analysis in Historical Perspective 
 
The analysis of growth—and the specific factors that have sustained it and accompanied the 
structural changes associated with it—became a major topic of interest for thinkers in general 
and economists in particular in the early 18
th century. David Hume, whom Rostow claims to be 
“the first modern economist” (1990: 18) placed economic analysis at the center of his analysis of 
the human condition. He also offered economic concepts that are considered to “form a 
reasonably coherent and consistent theory of the dynamics of growth”. Classical economists who 
followed in his footsteps—such as Adam Smith, Alfred Marshall, David Ricardo and Allyn 
Young—were also obsessed with economic growth. Perhaps because of their fascination with the 
idea of human progress celebrated during the Enlightenment, they explored the determinants of 
economic development, and the role that policymakers could play in fostering prosperity. Their 
pioneering work highlighted important notions such as factor accumulation, factor substitution, 
technical change, or specialization, which are at the core of modern growth theory. 
 
But growth analysis slowed down after the Great Depression, as the intellectual focus shifted 
from long-run to short-run issues. In fact, with the notable exception of the pioneering work of 
Robert Solow, for much of the 20
th century and certainly through the 1960s and 1970s, 
macroeconomists tended to study business cycles issues that characterized the post-war period. 
As they tried to better understand stabilization policies—monetary and fiscal measures to avoid 
disruptive and costly inflation—few resources were devoted to the analysis of the long-run 
determinants of growth. 
 
Things changed in the 1980s when many prominent researchers focused their attention on 
differences in economic performance among countries. Surveys of economic growth and levels 
of performance in different parts of the world economy show that growth has indeed been 
uneven across countries and regions: between 1900 and 2001, per capita GDP in Western Europe 
increased by a factor of 6.65 (6.7 in Western Offshoots), compared to 5.2 in Latin America, 4.2 
in Eastern Europe, and only 2.5 in Africa.
4. The number of people living in high-growth 
environments or in countries with OECD per capita income levels has increased in the past 30 
years by a factor of four, from 1 billion to about 4 billion (Growth Commission 2008). 
 
Following the initial work by Harrod and Domar, the Solow-Swan model sparked the first major 
wave of systematic growth analysis. The objective was to understand the mechanics of growth, 
identify its determinants, and to develop techniques of growth accounting, which would help 
explain changes in the momentum and the role of economic policy. That first generation of 
growth researchers highlighted the centrality of capital. Their models featured neoclassical forms 
of production functions with specifications that relied on constant returns to scale, diminishing 
returns and some elasticity of substitution between inputs. In order to present a general 
equilibrium model of the economy, these researchers adopted a constant saving rate rule. This 
was a crude assumption but a major step forward in tool building, as it offered a clear 
demonstration that general equilibrium theory could be applied convincingly to real world issues. 
One important prediction from these models was the idea of conditional convergence, derived 
                                                            
4 Source: Maddison (2006). See also The World Economy: Historical Statistics, available at 
http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/ 5 
 
from the assumption of diminishing returns to capital—poor economies with lower capital per 
worker (relative to their long-run or steady state capital per worker) will grow faster.
5 
 
The major strength of that line of growth research was the explicit introduction of technology—
in addition of capital and labor—in the theoretical and empirical analysis. But the limited toolkit 
available at the time created a major shortcoming to that approach: technology was presented as 
an exogenously given public good.  The major prediction of the model based on the assumption 
of diminishing returns to capital was the idea that per capita growth will cease in the absence of 
continuous improvements in technology.  While that assumption allowed the model to maintain 
its key prediction of conditional convergence, it also seemed odd: technology, the main 
determinant of long-run growth was kept outside of the model.
6 
 
A new wave of growth modeling had to come up with a convincing theory of technological 
change—one that frees up the neoclassical model from the exogeneity of the main determinant of 
long-term growth. A first step was to design a theory of continuous growth fuelled by non-
diminishing returns to investment on a broad class of physical and human capital. The process 
could go on indefinitely if returns do not diminish as economies grow (Romer 1986). A second, 
more effective approach was to move away from the straightjacket of perfect competition, and 
incorporate imperfect competition and R&D theories in growth modeling—the rationale here 
being that such bold methodological moves helped explain why the economy would not run out 
of new ideas, and growth rates could be kept positive in the long run (Romer 1987, 1990; Aghion 
and Howitt, 1992). 
 
Endogenous growth theory, as it came to be known, maintained the assumption of nonrivalry 
because technology is indeed a very different type of factor from capital and labor—because it 
can be used indefinitely by others, at zero marginal cost. But it was important to take the next 
logical step and to better understand the public good characterization of technology, and think of 
it as a partially excludable nonrival good. The new wave therefore reclassified technology not 
just as a public good but as a good that is subject to a certain level of private control. By making 
it a partially excludable nonrival good and therefore giving it some degree of excludability or 
appropriability, it was possible to ensure that incentives matter for its production and use. The 
move away from perfect competition was therefore necessary. It has yielded high 
methodological payoffs. While neoclassical models of growth took technology and factor 
accumulation as exogenous, endogenous growth models explain why technology grows over 




5 Conditional convergence is a key property in Solow-Swan models. It is conditional because in these models, the 
steady-state levels of capital and output per worker depend on characteristics that vary across economies: saving 
rate, population growth rate, and the position of the production function. Many recent empirical studies have 
suggested that many other sources of cross-country variations such as government policies or the initial stock of 
human capital should be included in the analysis. 
6 The Cass (1965) and Koopmans (1965) versions of the neoclassical model, which built on Ramsey’s analysis of 
consumer optimization, attempted to provide an endogenous determination of saving rates. While this extension 
helped preserve conditional convergence, it did not solve the problem of long-run growth being determined by 
exogenous technological progress. 6 
 
Another important question has been to understand how technological diffusion takes place 
across countries and generates or sustains growth—and why it does not take root in others. 
Various interesting possibilities have recently been explored in an attempt to answer that critical 
question: one option has been to add an avenue for technology transfer as a new component to 
the endogenous growth model, that is, “endogenizing” the mechanism by which different 
countries achieve the ability to use various intermediate capital goods (Jones, 1998). Another 
popular route is to try to identify the fundamental determinants of growth through political 
economy models. Contrary to previous waves of growth modeling, this line of research focuses 
not on the proximate determinants of growth but on the impact on growth of such factors as 
institutions or the quality of governance (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001; Glaeser and Shleifer, 
2002). Several other approaches to growth research have yielded various insights to the mystery 
of modern economic growth (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2003; Jones 1998).  
 
Challenges of Explaining Convergence—and Divergence 
 
Both on the theoretical and empirical fronts, progress has been made in our understanding of 
growth in recent decades. On the theoretical front, the analysis of endogenous technical 
innovation and increasing returns to scale has provided economists with a rich general 
framework for capturing the broad picture and the mechanics of economic growth. From Solow’s 
work, we know the importance of the role of capital accumulation (both physical and human) 
and technical change in the growth process. From contributions by Becker, Heckman, Lucas
7 and 
many others, we also learned about the importance of human capital through diffusion of new 
knowledge or on-the-job learning, often stimulated by trade, and the so-called college wage 
premium. From work by North (1981), with supporting theoretical and empirical analyses 
exemplified by the works of Acemoglu et al. (2001), Greif (1993), Glaeser and Shleifer (2002), 
we have learned that growth is in large part driven by innovation and institutions that have 
evolved in countries where innovative activity is promoted and conditions are in place for change 
to take place. From Romer and the endogenous growth theorists, we have understood the need to 
change the focus of growth theory from accumulation to knowledge creation and innovation. In 
sum, we know quite a lot about some of the basic ingredients of growth. 
 
On the empirical side, the availability of standardized data sets—especially the Penn World 
tables—has stimulated interest in cross-country work that highlights systematic differences 
between high-growth and low-growth countries with regard to:  (i) Initial conditions (such as 
productivity, human capital, demographic structure, infrastructure, financial development, or 
inequality; (ii) Policy variables of various sorts such as trade openness, macroeconomic stability, 
levels and composition of public spending, taxation, or regulation; and (iii) Institutional variables 
such as general governance indicators, administrative capacity, rule of law, protection of 
property rights, or corruption. 
 
However, growth research still faces significant methodological difficulties, and challenges in 
identifying actionable policy levers to sustain and accelerate growth in specific countries.
8 
                                                            
7 See, in particular, Becker (1992); Heckman (2006); Lucas (2004).  
8 This is the case not only in development economics but also in various sub-disciplines of macroeconomics. 
Following the 2008-09 global crisis, a heated debate erupted among economists over the pertinence of the dominant 
models and their policy prescriptions. See for instance Blanchflower (2009), Krugman (2009), or Stiglitz (2009). For 7 
 
Deaton (2009) expresses the general sentiment of despair among economists when he notes that 
“empiricists and theorists seem further apart now than at any period in the last quarter century. 
Yet reintegration is hardly an option because without it there is no chance of long-term scientific 
progress.”  Despite many decades of theoretical advances and the development of new 
techniques to help policymakers in developing countries identify systematically constraints to 
growth, the intellectual and policy agenda ahead is indeed still daunting. 
 
Contrary to the prediction of most neoclassical models, convergence among world economies 
has been a limited phenomenon (Pritchett 1997). In 2008, GDP per capita in the United States 
(the world richest country) was three times higher than per capita income in neighboring Mexico, 
16 times higher than the per capita income in India, and 145 times the per capita income of the 
Democratic Republic of Congo. That gap is still widening. In most of the past century, incomes 




Yet, empirical observation reveals that divergence between industrialized and developing 
countries is not inexorable: in the past two centuries, some countries have been able to catch up 
with the most advanced economies (most notably Germany, France, and the USA in the late 19
th 
century, and the Nordic countries, Japan, and the 13 economies analyzed in the Growth 
Commission Report in the 20
th century). After the Industrial Revolution began in England in the 
mid-eighteenth century, experiments conducted in laboratories became the major source of 
technological invention and innovation (Lin, 1995). This was especially true for those macro-
inventions that consisted of radical new ideas and involved large, discrete, novel changes, as 
defined by Mokyr (1990). For developed countries, such inventions were essential to 
technological advances. With investment in research and development, innovation became 
endogenous (Romer, 1986; Lucas, 1988). Industrial structures were upgraded continuously and 
productivity increased. As a result, developed countries began to take off and the divergence 
between the North and the South appeared (Baumol, 1994). 
 
Historical evidence suggests that the growth process followed a similar pattern in developing 
economies such as the four East Asian dragons (Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong), which 
converged to the income levels of advanced western countries in the second half of the 20
th 
century. The same process subsequently allowed countries as diverse as China, Vietnam, 
Botswana, or Mauritius to achieve rapid and sustained growth in the 1980s and 1990s (Lin, 2003, 
2009; Rodrik, 2005). Except for that select group, most developing countries have failed to 
achieve their economic growth ambitions since World War II.  In fact, many have encountered 
frequent crises despite efforts from their governments and assistance from international 
development agencies. Yet, their experiences highlight the need to understand how developing 
countries can create the conditions for facilitating the flow of technologies and unleash growth, 
even in the context of sub-optimal microeconomic policies, weak institutions, and the absence of 
full-fledged private property rights. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
an assessment of controversies in development economics over methodological and policy issues, see Deaton (2009) 
and Ravallion (2009). 
9 From 1870 to 1990, the ratio of per capita incomes between the richest and the poorest countries increased by 
roughly a factor of five. See Pritchett (1997). 8 
 
The failures of growth research to predict divergence on a large scale indicates that the proposed 
theories did not capture the fundamental factor (s) that determines whether or not a developing 
country will converge. Some researchers have recently argued that the evolution of economic 
performance of nations is determined by conditional convergence—the idea that countries 
converge when all other macroeconomic variables that proxy for differences in steady-state 
characteristics are held constant—or to put it differently, the distribution of world income reveals 
the existence of convergence clubs among countries.
10 But the puzzle of diverging performances 
may be more easily sorted out through comparative analysis based on in-depth country studies 
and historical experience: the key ingredients for convergence of successful economies seem to 
lie in their ability to change their endowment structure, increase the pace of adoption of new 
ideas, speed up the process of industrial upgrading, and improve institutions simultaneously. 
Understanding and replicating the economic strategies and policies that allowed latecomers to 
catch up with the most advanced economies is still a major challenge for economists and 
policymakers around the world. 
 
New Directions in Applied Growth Research 
 
The disappointments of growth research—most notably from the perspective of policymakers 
seeking specific action plans to generate prosperity—have led to a reassessment of the validity 
and usefulness of existing knowledge, and to the development of radically new approaches. An 
important study by the World Bank (2005) focused on lessons of the 1990s highlighted the 
complexity of economic growth and recognized that it is not amenable to simple formulas. The 
report also noted that the reforms carried out in many developing countries in the 1990s focused 
too narrowly on the efficient use of resources, not on the expansion of capacity and growth. 
While they enabled better use of existing capacity, thereby establishing the basis for sustained 
long-run growth, they did not provide sufficient incentives for expanding that capacity.
11 The 
report concluded that there is no unique, universal set of rules to guide policymakers. It 
recommended less reliance on simple formulas and the elusive search for "best practices," and 
greater reliance on deeper economic analysis to identify each country's one or two most binding 
constraints on growth.  
 
That line of research is exemplified by the Growth Diagnostics framework, which aims at 
identifying the one or two most binding constraints on any developing economy, and then focus 
on lifting those. The main rationale is to ensure that economic reforms are contingent on the 
economic environment. “Presented with a laundry list of needed reforms, policymakers have 
either tried to fix all of the problems at once or started with reforms that were not crucial to their 
country's growth potential. And, more often than not, reforms have gotten in each other's way, 
with reform in one area creating unanticipated distortions in another area. By focusing on the one 
area that represents the biggest hurdle to growth, countries will be more likely to achieve success 
                                                            
10 That is the view expressed by Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992; and Baumol, 1986. Prescott (1999) is even more 
optimistic and expresses the view that continued divergence is not an option, and that the world distribution of 
income will eventually converge. 
11 As Zagha et al. note, “whereas reforms can help achieve efficiency gains, they will not put the economy on a 
sustained growth path unless they also strengthen production incentives and address market or government failures 
that undercut efforts to accumulate capital and boost productivity.” (2006). Pritchett (2006) suggests that economists 
abandon the quest for a single growth theory, and focus instead on developing a collection of growth and transition 
theories tailored to countries' particular circumstances. 9 
 
from their reform efforts.” (Hausmann, Rodrik and Velasco, 2008) The proposed approach offers 
a decision tree methodology to help identify the relevant binding constraints for each country. 
While it does not specifically identify the political costs and benefits of various reform strategies, 
its focus on alternative hypotheses can help clarify the options available to policymakers for 
responding to political constraints. “We are concerned mainly with short-run constraints. In this 
sense, our focus is on igniting growth and identifying constraints that inevitably emerge as an 
economy expands, not on anticipating tomorrow's constraints on growth.” (Idem, 2006) 
 
A key lesson from that approach is the notion that different countries (or even the same country 
at different points in time) require different policy choices to facilitate growth, and that the ‘big 
principles’ that growth requires—sound money, property rights, openness, free markets—can 
take many forms and that achieving them requires country-specific context and information. In 
particular, these principles need not take any one precise institutional or policy form. Each 
country is assumed to have some binding constraints to its growth potential and failure to 
identify and remove them would impede economic performance, even if every other production 
factors are satisfactory. The Growth Diagnostics approach is certainly an important advance in 
growth analysis. However, its model does not fully flesh out the notion of “binding constraint”.
12 
The variable definitions are deliberately left quite imprecise, which makes it challenging to 
operationalize them. 
 
Another influential new approach is the one adopted by researchers at the MIT Poverty Lab, who 
suggest that the quest for growth be re-centered on assessing the impact of a development project 
or program (against explicit counterfactual outcomes). Starting with the idea that credible impact 
evaluations are needed to ensure that the most effective programs are scaled up at the national or 
international levels, they design randomized control trials (RCTs) or social experiments that can 
be used to leverage the benefits of knowing which programs work which do not (Dufflo, 2004). 
Their approach is based on the notion that the standard aggregate growth paradigm relies, to a 
large extent and mistakenly, on the assumption of a rational representative agent. Stressing 
heterogeneity in country circumstances and among micro agents, this new wave of research 
attempts to explicitly account for the heterogeneity of individual households and firms in 
development analysis and policy.
13 It has produced some useful tools for understanding the 
effectiveness of some specific micro projects. But even assuming that they can actually transfer 
lessons from localized development experiences to different geographic or cultural areas
14, RCTs 




12 The methodology proposed for the identification of the binding constraints to growth relies on shadow prices. 
Even in countries where data on shadow prices are widely available, it is not clear that this would accurately identify 
areas in which progress is most needed in each country.  For example, one could imagine a simple model of growth 
for a low income country where technology and human capital are complementary.  In such a country, the returns to 
education and technology adoption would both be low due to low levels of human capital and technology.  An 
exclusive focus on shadow prices and an ignorance of cross-country comparison of levels would then suggest no 
need to improve education levels and encourage technology adoption. 
13 See Banerjee and Dufflo (2005). Bourguignon (2006) offers a compelling theoretical framework for making the 
same case.  
14 Critics of RCTs point to the fact that they often do not start from a clear strategic assessment of how a particular 
method would fit the knowledge gaps of highest priority. See Ravallion, (2009). 10 
 
While these new approaches to growth research have shed light on important questions, they 
have not provided sufficient guidance on how policymakers could foster the process of industrial 
upgrading and structural change. It would be desirable to complement them with structural 
analyses of the determinants of growth—specifically the identification of factors that would 
allow poor economies to move from one stage of development to another. 
 
3. THE UNIQUE CONTRIBUTION OF THE GROWTH REPORT 
 
Despite intellectual progress, some of the key questions on the growth research agenda today 
remain the same that confronted previous generations of researchers: If growth is driven in large 
part by innovation, why are some countries successful at innovating and adapting to change, 
while others are not? What are the forces that drive convergence and what are the factors that 
stifle material progress? What are the conditions for the kind of structural change that allow low-
income countries to become middle-income and then high-income economies? What are the 
most important determinants of growth (initial conditions, institutions, and policies)? What is the 
appropriate role for governments and markets in the growth dynamics? 
 
Faced with the difficulty of providing clear answers to such pressing questions and the 
impossibility of deriving actionable policy recommendations from growth analyses, some growth 
researchers have found it useful to avoid searching for robust determinants of growth, but to look 
instead for the stylized facts that can guide economic policy in developing countries. This 
approach goes back several decades, most notably to Kaldor’s six characteristics of 20
th century 
growth, derived from United States and United Kingdom macroeconomic data: (i) sustained rate 
of increase in labor productivity; (ii) sustained rate of increase in capital per worker; (iii) stable 
real interest rate or return on capital; (iv) stable ratio of capital to output; (v) stable shares of 
capital and labor as fractions of national income; and (vi), a wide variation in the rate of growth 
of fast growing economies, of the order of 2-5 percent (1961).  
 
More recently, Jones and Romer (2009) have identified a different set of stylized facts: (i) 
increases in the extent of the market—via globalization and urbanization; (ii) acceleration of the 
pace of growth over time, from virtually zero to relatively rapid rates; (iii) variation in the rate of 
growth of GDP per capita, which increases with the distance from the technology frontier; (iv) 
large income and total factor productivity differences; (v) increases in human capital per worker; 
and (vi) long-run stability of relative wages. 
 
The Growth Report: Strategies for Sustained Growth and Inclusive Development, a landmark 
study issued in 2008 by the Commission on Growth and Development, followed a similar 
approach but took it to a new level. It built on the findings of several other empirical studies 
initiated by the World Bank during the past two decades to reassess the past theories of economic 
growth and poverty reduction, and rethink its policy advice to developing countries.
15 Launched 
in April 2006, the Commission brought together 22 leading practitioners from government, 
business and the policymaking arenas, mostly from the developing world. It was chaired by 
Nobel Laureate Michael Spence and Danny Leipziger, a World Bank Vice-President. Over a 
period of two years the Commission sought to “gather the best understanding there is about the 
                                                            
15 These previous studies include, among others, the East Asian Miracle (1993), the Growth in the 1990’s (2005), 
the World Development Report on Agriculture for Development (2008). 11 
 
policies and strategies that underlie rapid and sustained economic growth and poverty 
reduction.” 
 
The Commission was established to take stock of the state of theoretical and empirical 
knowledge on economic growth with a view to drawing implications for policy, and avoiding the 
trap of purely theoretical exercises. It provides the following motivation for its work: (i) the 
sense that poverty cannot be reduced in isolation of economic growth, and that that link has been 
missing in many development strategies; (ii) increasing evidence that the economic and social 
forces underlying rapid and sustained growth are much less well understood than generally 
thought - economic advice to developing countries has been given with more confidence that 
justified by the state of knowledge; (iii) realization that the accumulation of highly relevant (both 
successful and unsuccessful) growth experiences over the past 20 years provides a unique source 
of learning; and (iv) growing awareness that, except for China and India, and other rapidly 
growing economies in East Asia, developing countries need to accelerate their rates of growth 
significantly for their incomes to catch up with income levels in industrialized countries, and for 
the world to achieve a better balance in the distribution of wealth and opportunity. 
 
The uniqueness of the Commission lays not only in its very diverse composition but also in the 
way it has reexamined growth analysis. Its approach has been to “try to assimilate and digest the 
cumulative experience of growth and development as well as careful and thoughtful policy 
analysis in a wide spectrum of fields. We then seek to share this understanding with political 
leaders and policy makers in developing countries, including the next generation of leaders; with 
an international community of advisors; and with investors, policy makers and leaders in 
advanced countries and international institutions who share the same goals.”
16 (Growth 
Commission 2008, p. x). 
 
The Report starts with the observation that “fast, sustained growth does not happen 
spontaneously. It requires long-term commitment by a country’s political leaders, a commitment 
pursued with patience, perseverance, and pragmatism” (idem, p. 2). It then identifies some of the 
distinctive characteristics of 13 high-growth economies
17 that have been able to grow at more 
than 7 percent for periods of more than 25 years since World War II. At that pace of expansion, 
an economy almost doubles in size every decade.
18 The report then asks how other developing 
countries can emulate them. Observing that each country has specific characteristics and 
historical experiences that must be reflected in its growth strategy, it does not attempt to provide 
a generic formula for policymakers to apply. However, it offers a framework that can help 
                                                            
16 The way the Commission organized its work was also quite unusual: first, it defined themes and issues deemed 
important for growth and development. Then, it invited world renowned academics, practitioners and experts to 
author papers exploring the state of knowledge in these themes and issues; those were reviewed and discussed at 
workshops. A working group which interacted with academics and commissioners, reviewed and commented on 
papers throughout the process. The working group also supported the Chairman in its drafting of the final report by 
reviewing interim drafts and providing comments. 
17 The list includes: Botswana, Brazil, China, Hong Kong (China), Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Malta, Oman, 
Singapore, Taiwan (China), and Thailand. 
18 Because growth rates of this magnitude for such long periods were unheard of before the latter part of the 20
th 
century, the authors acknowledge that their work could have been called a report on “economic miracles,” except 
that they believe the term is a misnomer” unlike miracles, sustained high growth can be explained and repeated. 12 
 
policymakers design a growth strategy. While it does not lay out a full set of answers, it suggests 
the right questions to be addressed.  
 
The conclusion is an optimistic one: rapid, sustained growth is not a miracle confined to certain 
parts of the world. It can be achieved by all developing countries. More important than the list of 
“growth ingredients”, which includes a wide range of policy prescriptions whose validity 
depends on specific contexts and conditions, the Report lists “five striking points of 
resemblance” among all highly successful countries: 
 
  Openness to the global economy. During their periods of fast growth, all the successful 
economies made the most of the global economy. They did so in at least two ways: first, 
they imported ideas, technology and know-how from the rest of the world—a world that 
has become more open and more tightly integrated since the end of World War II. 
Second, they exploited global demand, which provided an almost infinite market for their 
goods. In sum, successful economies “all imported what the rest of world knew, and 
exported what it wanted.”  The unsuccessful countries did the opposite. The lesson here is 
clear: in order to achieve sustained and dynamic growth, a developing country must: (i) 
rely on its comparative advantage ( that is, export what the rest of the world needs and 
upgrade its industries step by step at a pace consistent with the change in its endowment 
structure so as to make its economy competitive); and (ii), tap the potential of advantage 
of backwardness (imported ideas, technology and know-how from the rest of the world in 
the process of its industrial upgrading). 
 
  Macroeconomic stability. The second stylized fact of high-growth countries is their 
maintenance of stable macroeconomic environments. During their most successful 
periods, all the 13 countries avoided the kind of unpredictability in fiscal and monetary 
policies that damage private sector investment. While growth was sometimes 
accompanied by moderate inflation in some of them (Korea in the 1970s, China in the 
mid-1990s), budget deficits or even high ratios of debt-to-GDP, the situation never got 
out of control. 
 
  High saving and investment rates. Another characteristic of high-growth countries is their 
willingness to forgo current consumption in pursuit of higher levels of incomes in the 
future. High saving rates were matched by high investment rates. The fact that countries 
such as Singapore or Malaysia adopted mandatory saving schemes have led some 
researchers to stress the importance of deliberate saving policies as the main cause for 
these high saving and investment rates (Montiel and Serven 2008). In fact, the main 
explanation may be the ability of these countries to produce large economic surplus and 
to generate rates of return on investment that were high enough to provide strong 
incentives to save. In the 1970s, Southeast Asia and Latin America had similar savings 
rates. Twenty years later, the Asian rate was about 20 percentage points higher. 
 
  Market allocation. The Report notes that the 20
th century saw many experiments with 
alternatives to a market system. They all failed to help developing countries achieve 
sustained growth. While successful countries may differ in the intensity and strength of 
their property rights systems, they all adopted a well-functioning market mechanism that 13 
 
provided adequate price signals, transparent decision-making and good incentives. Their 
governments also did not resist the market forces in the reallocation of capital and labor 
from sector to sector, industry to industry.   
 
  Leadership  and governance. Sustained growth that can help overcome poverty is 
typically a multi-decade process, which only takes place in a stable and functional 
investment environment. It requires political leadership and effective, pragmatic and 
sometimes activist governments. 
 
The Growth Commission Report also identifies a series of “bad ideas” to be avoided by 
policymakers in their search for growth. The non-exhaustive list includes: subsidizing energy; 
relying on the civil service to deal with joblessness; reducing fiscal deficits by cutting 
expenditures on infrastructure investment; providing open-ended protection to domestic firms; 
imposing price controls to stem inflation; banning exports for long periods of time; resisting 
urbanization and measuring educational progress through infrastructure; ignoring environmental 
issues as an “unaffordable luxury”; adopting regulation of the banking system; or allowing the 
exchange rate to appreciate excessively. 
 
Summing up, it can be said that the Report represents a major step forward as it provides a 
practical approach to help policymakers today understand the economic dynamics of catching 
up, and to identify the precise (and probably country-specific) mechanics of creating the 
appropriate infrastructures, incentive systems, and institutions to facilitate and sustain the 
evolving growth process. It also offers a new challenge to growth researchers, who must come 
up with a conceptual framework for making sense of its main findings. 
 
4. A NEW STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS OF THE GROWTH REPORT 
 
The stylized facts identified by the Growth Commission Report can be either endogenous or 
exogenous variables to the growth process. In order to disentangle causes and effects, and 
prioritize public policies, it is useful to go beyond the mere association that these stylized facts 
suggest, and reflect on the dynamics of possible causal relationships. As Zellner (1979) pointed 
out, this requires some generally acceptable economic theory. The new structural economics 
approach provides such a framework. 
 
Principles of New Structural Economics 
 
The new structural economics framework (Lin, 2010) is based on the analysis of the growth 
process in modern times and across continents. It starts with the observation that the main feature 
of modern economic development is continuous technological innovation and structural change. 
The optimal industrial structure in an economy, that is, the industrial structure that will make the 
economy most competitive domestically and internationally at any specific time, is endogenous 
to its comparative advantage, which in turn is determined by the given endowment structure of 
the economy at that time.
19 Economies that try to grow simply by adding more and more 
                                                            
19 A country’s competitive advantage refers to a situation where domestic industries fulfill the following four 
conditions: (i) They intensively use the nation’s abundant and relatively inexpensive factors of production; (ii) Their 
products have large domestic markets; (iii) Each industry forms a cluster; and (iv), domestic market for each 14 
 
physical capital or labor to the existing industries eventually run into diminishing returns; and 
economies that try to deviate from their comparative advantage are likely to perform poorly. 
 
Because the optimal industrial structure at any given time is endogenous to the existing factor 
endowments, a country trying to move up the ladder of technological development must first 
change its endowment structure.  With capital accumulation, the economy’s factor endowment 
structure evolves, pushing its industrial structure to deviate from the optimal determined by its 
previous level. Firms then need to upgrade their industries and technologies accordingly in order 
to maintain market competitiveness. 
 
If the economy follows its comparative advantage in the development of its industries, its 
industries will be most competitive in domestic and world markets. As a result, they will gain the 
largest possible market share and generate potentially the largest surplus. Capital investment will 
also have the largest possible return.  Consequently, households will have the highest savings 
propensity, resulting in an even faster upgrade of the country’s endowment structure. 
 
A developing country that follows its comparative advantage to develop its industries can also 
benefit from the advantage of backwardness in the upgrading process and grow faster than 
advanced countries. Enterprises in developing countries can benefit from the industrial and 
technological gap with developed countries by acquiring industrial and technological innovations 
that are consistent with their new comparative advantage through learning and borrowing from 
developed countries. 
 
The main question then is how to ensure that the economy grows in a manner that is consistent 
with its comparative advantage. The goal of most firms everywhere is profit maximization, 
which is, ceteris paribus, a function of relative prices of factor inputs. The criterion they use to 
select their industries and technology is typically the relative prices of capital, labor and natural 
resources. Therefore, the precondition for firms to follow the comparative advantage of the 
economy in their choice of technologies and industries is to have a relative price system which 
can reflect the relative scarcity of these production factors in the endowment structure. Such a 
relative price system exists only in a competitive market system. In developing countries where 
this is not usually not the case, it is necessary that government action be taken to improve various 
market institutions so as to create and protect effective competition in the product and factor 
markets. 
 
In the process of industrial upgrading, firms need to have information about production 
technologies and product markets.  If information is not freely available, each firm will need to 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
industry is competitive (Porter 1990). A country’s comparative advantage is  the situation in which it produces a 
good or service as a lower opportunity cost than that of its competitors. Such condition is based on the country’s 
possession of comparative advantage in that product or service determined by its endowment structure at any given 
time (Lin 2010). The first condition for competitive advantage listed by Porter supposes that the industries should be 
the economy’s comparative advantage determined by the nations’ endowments. The third and the fourth conditions 
will hold only if the industries are consistent with the nation’s competitive advantage. Therefore, the four conditions 
can be reduced to two independent conditions: the comparative advantage and domestic market size. Among these 
two independent conditions, the comparative advantage is the most important because if an industry corresponds to 
the country’s comparative advantage, the industry’s product will have a global market.  That is why many of the 
richest countries of the world are very small (Lin and Ren 2007). 15 
 
invest resources to search for it, collect and analyze it. For individual firms in developing 
countries, industrial upgrading is therefore a high-reward, high-risk process. First movers who 
attempt to enter new industries can either fail—because they target the wrong industries—or 
succeed—because the industry is consistent with the country’s new comparative advantage.  In 
case of success, their experience offers valuable and free information to other prospective 
entrants. They will not have monopoly rent because of competition from new entry. Moreover, 
these first movers often need to devote resources to train workers on the new business processes 
and techniques, who may be then hired by competitors. First movers generate demand for new 
activities and human capital which may not have existed otherwise. Even in situations where 
they fail, their bad experience also provides useful knowledge to other firms. Yet, they must bear 
the costs of failure. In other words, the social value of the first movers’ investments is usually 
much larger than their private value and there is an asymmetry between the first movers’ gain 
from success and the cost of failure. Successful industrial upgrading in an economy also requires 
new types of financial, legal, and other “soft” (or intangible) and “hard” (or tangible) 
infrastructure to facilitate production and market transactions and allow the economy to reach its 
production possibility frontier. The improvement of the hard and soft infrastructure requires 
coordination beyond individual firms’ decisions.  
 
Economic development is therefore a dynamic process marked with externalities and requiring 
coordination. While the market is a necessary basic mechanism for effective resource allocation 
at each given stage of development, governments must play a proactive, facilitating role for an 
economy to move from one stage to another. They must intervene to allow markets to function 
properly. They can do so by (i) providing information about new industries that are consistent 
with the new comparative advantage determined by change in the economy’s endowment 
structure; (ii) coordinating investments in related industries and the required improvements in 
infrastructure; (iii) subsidizing activities with externalities in the process of industrial upgrading 
and structural change; and (iv) catalyzing the development of new industries by incubation or by 
attracting foreign direct investment to overcome the deficits in social capital and other intangible 
constraints. 
 
In sum, the new structural economics framework is three-pronged: it includes an understanding 
of a country’s comparative advantage defined as the evolving potential of its endowment 
structure; reliance on the market as the optimal resource allocation mechanism at any given stage 
of development; and the recognition of a facilitating role of the state in the process of industrial 
upgrading. It helps explain the economic performance of the most successful developing 
countries. 
 
Key Findings of the Growth Commission: A New Structural Analysis  
 
The new structural economics provides a framework for understanding the endogeneity and 
exogeneity issues surrounding the five stylized facts of the Growth Commission Report: (i) 
exploiting the world economy through openness; (ii) maintaining macroeconomic stability; (iii) 
keeping high rates of saving and investment; (v) using markets to allocate resources; and (v), 
having committed, credible, and capable governments. The first three stylized facts are logical 
outcomes of a country following its comparative advantage determined by its factor endowments 
in each stage of development. The fourth stylized fact, the market mechanism, is the 16 
 
precondition for a country to follow its comparative advantage. The last stylized fact, a 
committed, credible, and capable government, is a prediction as well as a consequence of 
following comparative advantage. 
 
First, if a country follows its comparative advantage in its development strategy,
 20 it will have an 
open economy, and produce whatever is consistent with its existing endowment structure and 
export to the international market,
21 while importing whatever goods and services are not in its 
comparative advantage. Its trade dependency ratio will be endogenous to its comparative 
advantage and will be larger than would be the case otherwise. Its economy will become 
competitive and its endowment structure and industrial structure will be upgraded at the fastest 
pace possible. In the industrial upgrading process, the country will be able to tap into the 
advantage of backwardness by borrowing technologies and industries from advanced countries.  
The country will achieve a much faster rate of growth than the advanced countries, as its 
innovation cost will be smaller than that of countries already on the global technology frontier. 
Its economy will therefore achieve convergence with high-income countries. From that 
perspective, exploiting the world economy through openness (stylized fact 1) is a result of the 
growth strategy that facilitates industrial upgrading according to the comparative advantage 
determined by the country’s endowment structure.  
 
Macroeconomic stability (stylized fact 2) is also a consequence of a country following 
comparative advantage in its development strategy. If a country does so, its economy will be 
competitive. Its industries will be viable in an open, competitive market (Lin 2009). The 
upgrading of industries will mainly rely on its own capital accumulation process. The 
government will have a strong fiscal position, for several reasons: first, it will reap the benefits of 
dynamic growth; second, there will be no need for subsidizing non viable firms; and third, the 
economy will generate more job opportunities and less unemployment. The country will also be 
much less exposed to homegrown crises due to uncompetitive industries, currency mismatch, or 
fiscal crises. Because of its external competitiveness and limited reliance on capital inflows for 
growth, the country is also likely to have strong external accounts. Therefore, the government 
will be in a strong position to adopt countercyclical measures if there are shocks to the economy 
from global crises. 
 
Recording high rates of saving and investment (stylized fact 3) is another logical result of the 
new structural economics approach of developing industries that are consistent with comparative 
advantage. Such a strategy allows a developing economy to be most competitive and produce the 
largest possible economic surplus (profits). This yields the highest savings for the economy. 
Competitive industries also imply high return on investment, which in turn provides additional 
incentives to save and invest. Moreover, good public investments can enhance the economy’s 
growth potential, reduce transaction costs on the private sector, increase the rate of return on 
private investment, and generate enough tax revenues in the future to liquidate the initial costs. 
                                                            
20 We define the development strategy here in the same way as Rodrik (2005), referring to policies and institutional 
arrangements adopted by the government in a developing country for achieving economic convergence with the 
living standards prevailing in advanced countries. 
21 Exportable manufacturing goods are of particular importance, as they allow late-comers in the industrialization 
process to position themselves in industries where they have lower wages and other competitive advantages than 
more advanced economies. 17 
 
 
Adopting a market system to allocate resources (stylized fact 4) is a necessary condition for an 
economy to follow comparative advantage in its development. Most firms are set up to pursue 
profits. They will follow the economy’s comparative advantage in their decisions regarding the 
adoption of technology and entry into industries if relative prices reflect the relative scarcity of 
each factor in the endowment structure. This only happens in an economy with competitive 
markets (Lin 2009; Lin and Chang 2009). Therefore, a competitive market is the economy’s 
optimal mechanism for resource allocation at each stage of its development. 
 
Building committed, credible, and capable governments (stylized fact 5), that is, creating a 
facilitating state, is also a condition for an economy to adopt a comparative-advantage following 
strategy in its development process. For a developing economy to upgrade from one industrial 
structure to another, the government needs to play a facilitating role in improving soft and hard 
infrastructures and in overcoming the information, coordination and externality issues. 
Therefore, a committed, credible and capable government is a precondition for sustainable 
growth. But capable states can also be seen as a consequence of that strategy: if the 
government’s goal is to facilitate a development process that is consistent with the country’s 
comparative advantage, its intervention will be implemented more easily and more successfully, 
which will strengthen its credibility. So a committed, credible and capable state can also be 
viewed as the outcome of the country’s following its comparative advantage in its development. 
 
Beyond those stylized facts, the Growth Commission Report also identified “bad ideas” to be 
avoided by policymakers in developing countries. While the Report prudently offers the caveat 
that there are situations and circumstances that may justify limited or temporary resort to some of 
the policies listed under that category, it notes that “the overwhelming weight of evidence 
suggests that such policies involve large costs and their stated objectives—which are often 
admirable—are usually much better served through other means.” (p. 68) These “bad ideas” 
include costly or unsustainable policy decisions such as subsidizing energy, relying on the civil 
service to deal with joblessness, providing open-ended protection, reducing fiscal deficits by 
cutting expenditures on infrastructure investment, or allowing the exchange rate to appreciate 
excessively. 
 
Policy recommendations derived from the new structural economics approach would help 
developing country governments avoid such “bad ideas”. Energy subsidies for instance are 
adopted in most countries to support nonviable firms (political economy rationale), or to help the 
poor (equity rationale). Large, costly and unsustainable government subsidies in developing 
countries arise from the fact that development strategies deviate substantially from their optimal 
industrial structure. If a country follows its comparative advantage in its development strategy, 
few of its state-owned or private enterprises will be nonviable, and there will be no need to 
provide subsidies to firms. Its economy will achieve dynamic growth, which would allow 
poverty to be reduced rapidly. There will be little need to subsidize the poor through price 
distortions. By growing fast, the economy will create many job opportunities. Viable private 
firms offer the best insurance against joblessness. So there will be no need to use public 
employment as a tool to deal with joblessness. Moreover, the government will not have to use 
open-ended protection to support or subsidize nonviable firms. 
 18 
 
Thanks to the country’s good economic performance, the government’s fiscal position is likely to 
be strong and there will be no justification for the kind of erratic budget policies (expenditure 
cuts, public investment delays, payment arrears, salary freezes, etc.) that are often caused by 
large fiscal deficits. Likewise, a government that implements a development strategy consistent 
with the country’s comparative advantage will not have to recourse to an overvalued exchange 
rate as a means for subsidizing nonviable firms that are created in the framework of comparative 




The quest for economic growth has preoccupied economists and policymakers since at least the 
18
th century. Much progress has been achieved over the past 50 years, most notably on 
theoretical and empirical grounds. On the theoretical front, the analysis of endogenous technical 
innovation and increasing returns to scale has provided economists with a rich general 
framework for capturing the broad picture and the mechanics of economic growth. On the 
empirical side, the availability of standardized data sets such as the Penn World Tables has 
stimulated interest in cross-country work that highlights systematic differences between high-
growth and low-growth countries with regard to initial conditions, policy and institutional 
variables. 
 
Yet, despite progress, policymakers around the world—especially in developing countries, still 
face difficulty  in identifying actionable specific policy levers that can help ignite and sustain the 
type of dynamic growth rates that are necessary to reduce poverty. In recent years, growth 
researchers have responded to their concerns by trying to address various new challenges: the 
lack of convergence among countries; the identification of robust determinants of economic 
performance; the design of the supporting institutions for innovation and technological change, 
which are widely acknowledged to be the foundations for structural change and prosperity; and 
the identification of binding constraints to growth, the evaluation of successful development 
programs through randomized control trials, with the goal of scaling them up whenever possible. 
 
By adopting a radically different approach to growth analysis, the Growth Report has made an 
important contribution to knowledge. It has identified five stylized facts (openness, 
macroeconomic stability, high rates of saving and investment, market mechanism, committed, 
credible and capable government) that can guide policymaking in developing countries. But in 
doing so, the Report has not disentangled causes and consequences. 
 
The new structural economics framework proposed in Lin (2010) helps explain the endogeneity 
and exogeneity issues surrounding these five stylized facts. A central proposition that runs 
through this paper is that, developing countries that implement economic policies in 
contradiction with their comparative advantage tend to perform poorly and suffer 
macroeconomic instability. They do not exploit the benefits of globalization to the fullest. 
Typical features of such strategies are large budget deficits due to government support of non-
viable firms, inflationary policies caused by excessive consumption, financial repression, and 
over-valued exchange rates in the context of low productivity. By contrast, countries that adopt 
comparative advantage-following strategies are typically in the position to achieve dynamic 
growth. They rely on the market as the key mechanism for allocating resources at any given 19 
 
stage of development, and they have credible and capable governments. As a consequence of 
following their comparative advantage, they have an open economy, achieve macroeconomic 
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